!!ANNOUNCEMENT!!
Workshop on "Taxing Cross-Border Commuters: Öresund and Beyond" in Uppsala, May 22-23, 2012.
Click HERE for details


Working Papers:

Conley, J.P., M.J.Crucini, R.A.Driskill, A.S.Önder (2011) "Incentives and the Effects of Publication Lags on Life Cycle Research Productivity in Economics" NBER Working Paper no.17043

We investigate whether and in what ways the increase in average publication time in journals has affected the publication behavior of the economics profession as measured by journal publication.  In particular, we look at whether representative researchers' productivities vary according to the cohort to which they belong. The somewhat intuitive notion would be that members of more recent cohorts should have shorter curriculum vitae after six years than earlier cohorts had.  We construct a simple model that captures this intuition, and see whether and in what manner the theory and data support this concern. Our primary finding is that there is a remarkable consistency of some aspects of journal-publication productivity across cohorts.
Click HERE to read the VOX Column on this paper!


Önder, A.S. (2009) "Capital Tax Competition When Monetary Competition is Present ," UCFS Working Paper  no.2009:14

In a model that allows for international trade in goods markets as well as in money markets, interactions between the capital tax rate and the inflation rate are investigated. It is shown that interactions of capital tax rate and inflation rate create horizontal and vertical externalities. Optimal levels of the capital tax rate and the inflation rate depend on how these externalities dominate one another. If a currency union is formed, the inflation rate that prevails across the currency union will be higher than the inflation rate in either country under monetary independence. Although inflation rate will be higher, an individual country may choose a lower or a higher capital tax rate than that under monetary independence, depending on the income elasticity of demand for its national currency.


Önder, A.S. and H.Schlunk (2009) "State Taxes, Tax Exemptions, and What They Reveal about Elderly Migration" UCFS Working Paper no.2009:12

We use the U.S. elderly migration data for 1995-2000 to test how taxes and specific tax exemptions affect migration decisions of the elderly population. We show that the elderly prefer to migrate to states with low inheritance and estate tax, high property tax, low price level, low amount of Federal revenue transfers, high level of local amenities, and high temperatures. In addition, exemption of prescription drugs from sales tax and the existence of pension exemptions affect elderly in-migration positively and significantly.


Published Papers:

Önder, A.S. (2008) "On Inflation Tax Competition" AEF Papers and Proceedings, vol.32, pp.263-264

Inflation tax is another source of government revenue, and under independent monetary policies, governments may engage in inflation tax competition in order to increase government revenue. Monetary unification abolishes the inflation tax competition between governments, hence countries participating in a monetary union end up with a higher inflation level than they would have under independent monetary policies. Despite a higher inflation level, monetary unification improves member countries' welfare. This is a result of monetary policy cooperation among member countries that eliminates the inefficiently low inflation levels.


Önder, A.S. (2008) "Optimum Monetary Policy During Monetary Union Enlargement" Quantitative Economic Policy, eds. R. Neck, C. Richter, P. Mooslechner, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, pp.275-291

What is an optimal monetary policy for a candidate country and the monetary union to follow prior to accession? In a hypothetical setting, where there are no pre-accession monetary rules for accession countries how do bilateral exchange rates between the currency union's currency and accession countries' currencies affect the currency union's inflation target? This paper presents a nominal exchange rate based criterion both for welfare of the accession country and for currency union's monetary policy target. An accession country with an appreciating currency will find it non-optimal to join the currency union, and in case of an accession, currency union's monetary authority will need to adjust its optimal target criterion for inflation to a higher level. Accession of a country with a depreciating currency will lower the optimal target for the currency union.

Ali Sina Önder
Uppsala Universitet
Dept. of Economics
and
Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies